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                                Uncertainty in medicine: Clich or oblivion
                            
                                Bernard W K Lau 劉偉楷 
                                Human beings are, to some degree or other, afraid of uncertainty; and if possible
                                we always work towards seeking certainty. There seems in our culture to be an expectation
                                that doctors always have the answers and they are presumed to be experts in knowing,
                                but unfortunately uncertainty is a way of life for doctors. In reality, there is
                                at least a grain of truth that medical knowledge is often engulfed and infiltrated
                                by a certain degree of uncertainty,1 which is defined as the inability
                                to determine the meaning of events, in a situation where the decision-maker is unable
                                to predict outcomes accurately.2 That is, given current knowledge, more
                                than one event is often possible. That is why a clinical condition may have several,
                                if not many, differential diagnoses and in the same vein a patient's problem may
                                indeed have more than one determinant cause. In medicine, one wins a diagnostic
                                gamble by believing and acting on a correct diagnosis or by rejecting an incorrect
                                diagnosis. Or one loses by believing and acting on an incorrect diagnosis or by
                                rejecting a correct diagnosis. For a doctor trained in the Mechanistic Paradigm's
                                model of causality, he will prefer to work from the heuristic principle:
                             
                                "Find the cause, then treat". Without a known cause there seems to be no clear basis
                                for treatment, and the doctor is often uneasy with whatever treatment he undertakes.3 
                                For all concerned in health care, the passion for certainty will keep costs high.
                                It leads the doctor to use whatever technology is available to obtain a less equivocal
                                diagnosis, and it also leads patients to demand such diagnostic overkill. Even when
                                doctors themselves do not see a need to perform all the prescribed procedures, they
                                may do so anyway to protect themselves against malpractice suits in which the courts
                                apply medicine's own standards of certainty. By those standards a doctor must do
                                something necessary to be certain as is possible before acting.3 
                                In most cases uncertainty is easily tolerated because the consequences of getting
                                it wrong are relatively unimportant (for example, is the patient's sore throat due
                                to virus or bacterium?). Uncertainty is more stressful when misdiagnosis may have
                                dire consequences, and most doctors would go as far as possible to reduce uncertainty
                                when they believe the probability of serious illness is high.4 
                                While patients might be interested to know the diagnosis, sometimes this means very
                                little to them and it is prognosis that is more important to them as individuals.5
                                Questions about prognosis frequently raised by patients and their families take
                                varying forms: 
                                When will I get better? Will I be completely well? What are the chances of the disease
                                recurring? No doubt, one of the most difficult tasks in medicine is predicting how
                                long someone with a terminal illness may live. No accurate method is usually available,
                                largely because of the multiple variables that influence when a patient will die.6
                                When considering prognosis, the doctor must make a complete diagnosis relating the
                                pathology present to the individual concerned. Even when an accurate diagnosis can
                                be made, it can be notoriously difficult to predict the course of events in a given
                                instance of a disease. In general practice the diagnosis is often in doubt, at least
                                in the early or undifferentiated stages, and this further complicates the task.5,8 
                                In so far as prognosis implies a forecast of the probable course and result of an
                                illness, particularly with regard to the prospect of recovery,7 such
                                a prediction always contains an element of irreducible uncertainty. Uncertainty
                                in prediction simply means that, given current knowledge, there are multiple possible
                                future states of nature. Moreover, any prediction involving people tends to be misleading,
                                precisely because the numbers needed to make accurate predictions are so huge. The
                                result is that predictions become meaningless - because they do not apply to any
                                individual person.9 This is where the beauty of evidence-based medicine
                                comes in. 
                                Essentially evidence-based medicine is a process of having clinical practice based
                                on validated information.10 This approach suggests that a doctor should
                                use the best available evidence when making a decision to use a diagnostic test
                                or choose a treatment.11 However, it must be acknowledged that evidence-based
                                practice is no panacea.4 Even its proponents make no pretence that it
                                can provide all the answers. The main criticism against it is that it may foster
                                the rigidity of "cookbook medicine" based on the biased opinions of western scientific
                                medicine and statistics, at the expense of ignoring the art of medicine and individual
                                patient and physician and patient variation in experience and judgement.12
                                The contention is that there has always been a place in medicine for clinical judgement
                                that is based on personal experience and intuition and that takes into account intangible
                                factors such as physician's knowledge of a particular patient or family. Traditionally
                                this kind of skill has been thought of as "the art of medicine".3 
                                By all means good medicine would allow probability estimates to be derived not only
                                from tables of figures, but also from the subjective judgement of the doctor, patient,
                                and family. It means that a doctor's knowledge of a particular patient's history
                                may be more useful than statistical tables in assessing the likelihood that the
                                patient has a particular disease or will respond to a particular treatment. And
                                it means that there may be times when the patient or the patient's family are better
                                judges of these probabilities than the doctor, especially a doctor who does not
                                have prior knowledge of the patient.3 
                                There is a saying in medicine that every patient is unique and should therefore
                                deserve to be treated judiciously as a different individual from others. In any
                                event, what appropriate evidence-based medicine should be in any locality in the
                                world is again a matter of judgement. 
                                It is possible that shared decision-making,13,14 a particular type of
                                doctor-patient interaction whereby the patient brings his/her individual preferences
                                and the doctor contributes the medical expertise, is a partial solution to the current
                                state of medical uncertainty.15 Moreover, shared decision-making has
                                been shown to lead to higher rates of satisfaction and better treatment results.
                                This might be an area worthy of more research. 
                                Hence, is the problem one of uncertain diagnosis or uncertain management? At the
                                end of the day, it may well be the uncertain doctor, as ultimately it is the doctor,
                                who plays the key role in managing uncertainty.8 It would seem that as
                                long as medical uncertainty is part of reality in life, as veracious as the Heisenberg
                                Uncertainty Principle, we may have to put up with it, after all. It then begs the
                                question: is it good enough to be sure beyond reasonable doubt, not beyond all doubt? 
                                Editors' Note 
                                This editorial was written by Bernard shortly before his sudden and unexpected death
                                    on June 13th.Bernard was a regular contributor to the College journal. A thoughtful, kind and
                                    considerate person who was never afraid to offer his opinion nor to challenge the
                                    accepted paradigm.
 We struggled with the decision to publish this piece, but in the end decided that
                                    Bernards' own words should speak for him. He will be sadly missed.
 
 
                                References
                                
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                                        1998.Morrel D. The art of general practice. Oxford: Oxford Medical Publications, 1991.Rakel RE. Textbook of Family Medicine. Philadelphia, Saunders, 2002.Seale C, Pattison S, Davey B. Medical knowledge: Doubt and uncertainty. Buckingham:
                                        OUP, 2001.Jones R, Britten N, Culpepper L, et al. Oxford Textbook of primary medical care.
                                        Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.Cole KC. The Universe and the teacup: The mathematics of truth and beauty. London:
                                        Abacus, 1998.Murtagh J. General Practice. Sydney: McGraw-Hill, 2003.Ebell MH. Evidence-Based Diagnosis. New York: Springer, 2001.Gabbay M. The Evidence-Based Primary Care Handbook. London: RSMP, 1999.Frosch DL, Kaplan RM. Shared decision making in clinical medicine: Past research
                                        and future directions. Am J Prev Med 1999;17: 285-294.Scheibler F, Janssen C, Pfaff H. Shared decision making: An overview of international
                                        research literature. Sozial-und-Praventivmedizin 2003;48:11-23.Ghosh AK. Dealing with medical uncertainty: A physician's perspective. Minn Med
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